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CHURCH AND STATE FISCAL RELATIONS
Abstract
The relationship between the government and the church is frequently debated in the United
States. One main concern is the legality of the government granting funding to churches,
religious schools, and Christian organizations. Religious institutions are separated from the
government; thus, they can be tax-exempt and able to discriminate on a religious basis. The
Supreme Court has analyzed the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses in several cases to
determine when the government may grant funds to religious institutions. In the past decade,
administrative code and judicial case law have both expanded religious institutions’ ability to
receive governmental funds. Inevitably, controversy surrounds each decision and the evolving
relationship between the church and state.1

1

This paper focuses primarily on churches and Christian organizations; however, the principles established can be
applied to other religious institutions.
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Analyzing the Fiscal Relationship Between the Church and State
In a famous letter, Thomas Jefferson wrote of the American people’s desire that “their
legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.”2 Since then, his
words have been used by many to describe the ideal relationship between the government and
religion. Yet, a total isolation of church and state is impossible in practice, and controversy
surrounds the issue. In the past decade, a prominent question has risen: should churches and
religious organizations legally be permitted to receive federal funds?3 In general, religious
institutions possess several benefits aimed to separate them from the government, including tax
exemptions and the freedom to discriminate in employment on the basis of religion. Typically,
under the Establishment Clause, these religious institutions cannot directly receive public funds.
However, the Supreme Court seems to have qualified and amended this interpretation of the
Clause in recent case law. Moreover, many churches have been deemed eligible for
governmental relief funds. Ultimately, the contention over the fiscal relationship between the
church and state is likely to continue for many years to come.
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
The Constitution has two vital religious provisions: the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses. These are found within the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting

2

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802) (on file with the Library of
Congress).
3
See Garrett Epps, A Major Church-State Ruling That Shouldn’t Have Happened, ATLANTIC ONLINE (June 27,
2017), https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5NWR-RY61-JCG7-V4D800000-00&context=1516831; Emily Shugerman, Supreme Court Sides with Church in Landmark Decision on State
Funding for Religious Organizations, THE INDEPENDENT (June 26, 2017),
https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5NWR-RY61-JCG7-V4D8-0000000&context=1516831.
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an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”4 The Supreme Court’s
interpretation and application of these clauses has adapted over the years. However, when
analyzing Establishment Clause cases concerning governmental funds to religious organizations,
the Supreme Court often uses the Lemon test, as established in Lemon v. Kurtzman.5 This test has
three parts: “purpose, effect, and entanglement.”6
Establishment Clause: Lemon Test
In 1968 and 1969, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island passed statutes to fund a portion of
private school teachers’ salaries.7 Lemon, whose child was enrolled in a Pennsylvania public
school, sued along with other taxpayers, claiming the statute violated the Establishment Clause.8
In an overwhelming decision, the Supreme Court held the statutes were unconstitutional and
established the three-part Lemon test to determine if a law violated the Establishment Clause.9
The first prong of this test requires the court to ensure the government has a secular
purpose in granting the aid.10 In general, a governmental program satisfies this prong when it
applies broad benefits for a large group that may include religious institutions, without singling
them out.11 For example, a state’s aim to enable low-income students to receive post-secondary
education may be a legitimate, secular interest, even if some students may use the funds to attend
a religious college.12

4

U.S. CONST. AMEND. I (emphasis added).
Valerie C. Brannon, Evaluating Federal Financial Assistance Under the Constitution’s Religion Clauses,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, (Sept. 9, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46517.pdf.
6
Id.
7
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8
Id. at 606-607.
9
Id. at 612-613.
10
Id. at 611.
11
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-74 (1970).
12
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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For the second prong of the Lemon test, the court must verify that the primary effect of
the aid does not inhibit nor advance religion.13 In many cases, the Supreme Court has suggested
that an indirect aid program that neutrally benefits both secular and religious groups does not
violate this prong.14 For example, a state may grant aid in the form of educational materials to
both public and religious schools. However, direct aid programs will fail this prong if the
government lacks an effective means of ensuring the funds are used for nonreligious purposes;
restrictions are often required to verify a religious institution uses the funds appropriately.15 Yet,
religious institutions cannot be automatically disqualified for aid on the assumption that they will
use the funds for primarily religious purposes.16
The final prong of the Lemon test ensures the program does not promote excessive
governmental entanglement with religion.17 This prong is not clearly defined, but most often
excludes programs that involve continued governmental monitoring of a religious institution.18
With several cases, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a continuing intimate relationship
between the government and a religious entity would unconstitutionally blur the line between the
church and state.19
However, while the Lemon test is the predominant tool used for Establishment Clause
cases, courts have applied it inconsistently.20 In some cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted
and applied the test in varying ways, while in others the Court has abandoned—but not

13

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
15
Brannon, supra note 5, at 10.
16
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 612 (1988).
17
Brannon, supra note 5, at 15.
18
See Agostini v. Felton, 521, U.S. 203, 234 (1997).
19
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621.
20
Brannon, supra note 5, at 4.
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overruled—the Lemon test entirely.21 Moreover, the Justices of the Supreme Court have had
many different interpretations of the test and contrasting opinions on when and how it should be
applied. Justice Alito argued in one case that the Lemon test should not be used in assessing
longstanding practices or symbols, like prayer before governmental sessions.22 Instead, he argued
that these practices “should…be considered constitutional so long as they ‘follow in’ a historical
‘tradition’ of religious accommodation.”23 Occasionally, the Supreme Court uses a test proposed
by Justice O’Connor in which the court evaluates “whether a ‘reasonable observer’ would think
the government is endorsing religion.”24 Nevertheless, since the Lemon test has not yet been
overruled, it is likely to remain in use, particularly in the lower courts.
Free Exercise Clause
While the Establishment Clause aims to prevent the government from the endorsement of
or excessive involvement with religions, the Free Exercise Clause aims to protect the practice of
religion.25 Laws that target religion or infringe on religious practices are generally held to strict
scrutiny; they are only valid when “justified by a compelling interest and [they are] narrowly
tailored to advance that interest.”26 When an aid program exempts religious institutions, it may
violate the Free Exercise Clause by indirectly penalizing the institutions for their religious
nature.27 One of the most prominent cases exemplifying this is Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer.

21

See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014).
23
Brannon, supra note 5, at 6; quoting Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2089 (2019) (plurality
opinion).
24
Brannon, supra note 5, at 5.
25
Id. at 16.
26
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Brannon, supra note 4, at 16.
27
Brannon, supra note 5, at 16-17.
22
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Trinity Lutheran Church
In 2017, the Supreme Court ruled on a controversial case involving church and state
fiscal relations.28 The plaintiff, Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center, was a daycare
and preschool.29 It was formerly part of a nonprofit organization, yet it had merged with Trinity
Lutheran Church and operated on their property.30 The center applied for a Missouri grant—
funded through a fee on the sale of new tires throughout Missouri—that would replace their
playground’s coarse gravel with a rubber surface.31 The state awarded fourteen grants; though
the church ranked fifth out of the applicants, it was denied because the Missouri constitution
prohibited the state from giving funds to churches.32 Trinity Lutheran sued with the claim that
Missouri’s denial of its application violated the Free Exercise Clause.33 The case was initially
dismissed at the District and Circuit Courts, which held the Free Exercise Clause did not compel
Missouri to grant funds to the center.34 However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and held
that Missouri’s denial violated the Free Exercise Clause by their unequal treatment of the center
on the basis of religion.35
Since the church otherwise would have qualified for the public benefit but was
disqualified only due to its religious nature, the Supreme Court held the policy was
unconstitutional.36 Chief Justice Roberts wrote in the majority opinion, “The State in this case
expressly requires Trinity Lutheran to renounce its religious character in order to participate in

28

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
Id. at 2014.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 2017.
32
Id. at 2014; MO. CONST. art I, § 7.
33
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2014.
34
Id. at 2015.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 2019.
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an otherwise generally available public benefit program, for which it is fully qualified.”37 While
Missouri’s refusal to extend the grant did not prevent Trinity Lutheran from practicing their
religion, it automatically excluded them from benefitting from a public program if they chose to
remain a church.38 To uphold the Free Exercise Clause, courts must “subject to strict scrutiny
laws that target the religious for ‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious status.’”39
According to this strict scrutiny standard, Missouri’s exclusion directly punished the church’s
right to exercise its religion.40 Hence, the Court held that denying a public benefit to the church
merely because it is a church violates the Free Exercise Clause and is thus unconstitutional.
This decision is not without opponents. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor
argued this case weakens the separation of church and state.41 She contended that the center is
clearly integrated with the church, serving even as a ministry for the church’s mission.42 In
Sotomayor’s opinion, she wrote that the Establishment Clause prevents Missouri from granting
the center funds because it is used as part of Trinity Lutheran Church’s religious mission.43 She
agreed that strictly excluding religious entities from general public benefits would be a violation
of the Free Exercise Clause, but she contended that did not occur in this case.44 Unlike fire or
police protection, Missouri’s program was not a general public benefit; it was a selective one
with few recipients.45 Therefore, Sotomayor dissented with the majority and believed that
Missouri’s program did not violate the First Amendment.

37

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2024.
Id. at 2021-2022.
39
Id. at 2019 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 542 (1993)).
40
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2022.
41
See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 2028.
44
Id.
45
Id.
38
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State Constitutions
Thirty-eight states have prohibitions in their constitutions, similar to Missouri’s, that
prevent granting public money to churches.46 For example, Georgia’s Constitution contains a
clause that states “All persons shall have the free exercise of religion, without being obliged to
contribute to the support of any religious profession but their own.”47 Pennsylvania has an
analogous clause, “no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship or
erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his free
will and consent.”48 The policy behind these amendments is to prevent favoritism of select
religions. However, by prohibiting religious institutions from receiving aid, some argue that the
government shows favoritism to nonreligious entities.49 This discriminates against these religious
institutions and incidentally creates an incentive for a religious institution to become
nonreligious. Many states permit religious nonprofit organizations to receive similar grants, as
long as these institutions are not directly connected with a church.50 The problem arises when the
state’s funds would flow into a church’s finances, to be controlled and spent by the church
executives. This is considered direct funding of a church, which is strictly prohibited according
to most state constitutions.
Relief Funds to Christian Organizations
COVID-19 Relief

46

Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); see also N.J. CONST., art. XVIII (1776); DEL. CONST., art. I § 1 (1792); KY.
CONST., art. XII, § 3 (1792); VT. CONST., Ch. I, art. 3 (1793); TENN. CONST. art. XI § 3 (1796); OHIO CONST., art.
VIII, § 3 (1802).
47
GA. CONST., art. IV § 5 (1789).
48
PA. CONST., art. II (1776).
49
David G. Savage, Justices may rule for Religious Schools; The Supreme Court’s Conservatives See Bias when
Church Schools are Denied State Funds, LOS ANGELES TIMES, (January 23, 2020),
https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5Y1Y-RKR1-DXXV-31XB-0000000&context=1516831.
50
Epps, supra note 3.
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In March 2020, as the coronavirus was well underway in the United States, Congress
enacted the CARES Act to provide relief for the economy.51 As a part of this legislation, $350
billion were allocated for small businesses struggling financially due to the pandemic.52
Churches were included in this business category.53 The Small Business Administration, or the
SBA, stated that, “…faith-based organizations are eligible to receive SBA loans regardless of
whether they provide secular social services. That is, no otherwise eligible organization will be
disqualified from receiving a loan because of the religious nature…of the organization.”54 This
decision has sparked significant debate, as some contend it “could challenge the Constitution’s
prohibition of any law ‘respecting an establishment of religion.’”55 As per the SBA limitations
on the loans, 75% of these funds are to be devoted to payroll costs; this requirement is the same
for all recipients of the loans, not churches exclusively. Therefore, religious institutions can use
these funds to pay pastors, ministers, and other religious staff, in addition to using the funds for
rent and utilities.56
Opponents to this element of the Act argue that the direct funding of religious activities is
a blatant violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.57 This clause prevents
the government from designating any official religion and from acting in favor of any one
religion. These critics also note that churches do not have the same requirements as other small

51

CARES Act, S. 3548, 116th Cong. (2020).
Tom Gjelten, Another Break from the Past: Government Will Help Churches Pay Pastor Salaries, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/04/06/828462517/another-break-from-the-past-government-will-help-churches-pay-pastor-salaries.
53
Id.
54
U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING PARTICIPATION OF FATHBASED ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM (PPP) AND THE ECONOMIC INJURY DISASTER
LOAN PROGRAM (EIDL) 1 (2020).
55
Gjelten, supra note 52.
56
U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 54, at 2.
57
Government to Pay Pastor Salaries in $350 Billion Small Business Aid Package, AMERICAN ATHEISTS (Apr. 7,
2020), https://www.atheists.org/2020/04/churches-preference-small-business-aid-package/.
52
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businesses receiving funds under the Act. For example, churches do not file tax returns like other
businesses, which reduces government oversight of the churches’ use of these funds.58 They also
point out that some parts of the loans are forgivable, meaning the churches may not be required
to pay back the full loan, as long as they retain their staff.59
However, others argue that this component of the CARES Act does not violate the
Establishment Clause, and that its application is misunderstood. They state that religious workers
are just as deserving of “economic protection [as] every other American worker.”60 Churches in
particular suffered from the crisis, as many rely on weekly offerings. Therefore, when the
government produced a plan to offer loans to those in need, many argue it would be religious
discrimination to deny churches the same aid.61 This contention is built on the ruling in Trinity
Lutheran Church, which declared that denying a church a governmental benefit purely because
of its religious nature is discrimination and unconstitutional.62
Moreover, proponents of element of the CARES Act insist the CARES funding functions
like a bank loan, rather than mere stimulus money.63 They point out that the funds run through
banks and function as loans for organizations suffering significantly from the pandemic, and that
the loans function the same way—and with the same purpose—for churches as they do for other
small businesses.64

58

Government to Pay Pastor Salaries in $350 Billion Small Business Aid Package, supra note 57.
Id.
60
Michelle Boorstein, The Stimulus Package Will Cover Clergy Salaries. Some say the Government has Gone too
Far, THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2020/04/10/cares-actpaycheck-protection-churches-salaries-coronavirus/.
61
Id.
62
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2021.
63
Boorstein, supra note 60.
64
Id. (quoting Russell Moore).
59

CHURCH AND STATE FISCAL RELATIONS

13

In addition, some argue that the Act leads to non-discriminatory loans; formerly, the SBA
refused to give money to any religiously oriented business.65 In answering questions on the faithbased CARES relief, the SBA noted that some of their regulations “impermissibly exclude some
religious entities. Because those regulations bar the participation of a class of potential recipients
based solely on their religious status, SBA will decline to enforce these subsections and will
propose amendments to conform those regulations to the Constitution.”66 This follows the
current governmental trend of allowing public funds to flow to religious entities just as they flow
to non-religious ones.67
Yet, some churches are concerned that receiving governmental funds may bring
additional obligations. The SBA firmly states that receiving an SBA loan does not limit the
freedom of religious organizations, does not constitute a waiver of any federal rights, and that the
faith-based organizations receiving the loans will retain their independence and autonomy.68
However, they also note that receiving a loan carries temporary nondiscrimination legal
obligations.69 Recipients must not discriminate in the services or accommodations they offer to
the public; nevertheless, faith-based entities remain unrestricted in regards to employment and
membership in connection with their religion.70 Hence, a faith-based restaurant that is open to the
public must not discriminate in its services while receiving this loan. Yet, a faith-based
organization is still permitted to limit their distribution of food to its own members and may still

65

U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 54, at 1.
Id.
67
Gjelten, supra note 52.
68
U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 54, at 2.
69
Id.
70
Id.
66
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require employees to share the entity’s religion.71 These obligations are waived once the loan is
paid or forgiven.
FEMA Aid for Houses of Worship
In 2017, Hurricane Harvey tore through Texas and damaged many churches in the
process. While most nonprofits could apply to the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) for disaster-relief grants, churches and other houses of worship were ineligible, due to
their religious focus—any organization that devoted 50% or more of its space for religious
purposes was barred from receiving the grants.72 Three Texas churches sued FEMA, claiming its
policy of excluding faith-based organizations from relief was unconstitutional.73 These churches
highlighted the decision in Trinity Lutheran Church, which ruled that excluding a religious
institution from receiving a grant, purely because it is religious, is a violation of the First
Amendment.74 The churches further emphasized that centers focused on gardening, sewing,
ceramics, and coin collecting were eligible for FEMA funds, while the churches that provided
shelter to those displaced by disasters were barred from the grant.75 Hi-Way Tabernacle, the lead
plaintiff in the lawsuit, even served as a staging center for FEMA, distributing emergency meals
after the hurricane.76
A few months later, the judge denied the churches’ injunction request, distinguishing this
case from Trinity Lutheran Church because the Texas churches sought aid to repair sanctuaries

71

U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 54, at 3.
Cameron Langford & Britain Eakin, FEMA Does About-Face on Disaster Aid for Churches, COURTHOUSE NEWS
SERVICE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/fema-does-about-face-on-disaster-aid-for-churches/.
73
Church v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201244 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
74
Id. at 201250.
75
Langford & Eakin, supra note 72.
76
Church v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 201250.
72
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with a religious purpose, instead of a playground.77 However, in 2018, FEMA announced it
would amend its policy to permit public funds to be used to rebuild churches that suffered
damage from a disaster.78 Under the new policy, churches are considered community centers,
which enables them to receive grants on the condition that “their facilities aren’t primarily used
for ‘political, athletic, recreational, vocational, or academic training’ purposes.”79
This announcement ignited further controversy on the fiscal relationship between the
church and state. Some believe this act is a further violation of the Establishment Clause, as it
grants taxpayer money to religious institutions to use for facilities with a primarily religious
purpose.80 Critics fear the additional interpretation and application of the Trinity Lutheran
Church ruling; thus, as constitutional law professor Erwin Chemerinsky of Berkeley Law
explains, a question exists of exactly what the Trinity Lutheran Church decision requires.81
According to Chemerinsky, FEMA could have extended disaster relief to churches even before
the Trinity Lutheran Church ruling, analogous to the way the government already affords them
fire and police protection.82 Hence, he believes the policy revision is constitutional. However, his
main point of distinction is whether the Trinity Lutheran Church decision requires FEMA to
extend aid to houses of worship. In the Texas churches’ lawsuit, a Texas District Court ruled that
Trinity Lutheran Church does not mandate this extension, because Trinity Lutheran Church
involved the use of funds for a secular purpose while the Texas churches sought funds for a

77

Church v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 201250; see Langford & Eakin, supra note
72.
78
FEMA Changes Policy to Give Disaster Aid to Houses of Worship, AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE (Feb. 2018),
http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest.com%2Fmagazines%2Ffema-changespolicy-give-disaster-aid-houses%2Fdocview%2F2099896159%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D12085.
79
Id.
80
Langford & Eakin, supra note 72.
81
Id.
82
Id.
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religious facility.83 Yet, when FEMA updated its policy, it explained the change was prompted
by the decision in Trinity Lutheran Church.84 Therefore, it remains unclear exactly how far the
Trinity Lutheran Church decision extends and what it requires of governmental organizations
like FEMA.
Churches and Taxes
For the purposes of tax law, churches are deemed public charities, because the
advancement of religion is considered a charitable activity under current tax law. 85 This exempts
churches and other houses of worship from federal, state, and local property and income taxes.86
Churches are automatically considered tax exempt under Section 501(c)(3) as long as they meet
the five basic requirements detailed by the IRS.87 Churches are not required to apply for taxexemption status, though many do for the assurance that the church qualifies for the associated
benefits, like tax-deductible contributions. To maintain tax-exempt status, churches must not
violate the following five requirements. First, their earnings cannot inure to a private individual
or shareholder.88 Second, they must not substantially benefit private interests.89 Third, a
substantial part of their activities must not involve attempting to influence legislation.90 Fourth,
the church cannot participate or intervene in political campaigns.91 Finally, their purposes and

83

Church v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201244 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
Langford & Eakin, supra note 72.
85
Stephen Fishman, Are Churches Always Exempt? NOLO (Aug. 2013), https://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/are-churches-alwaysexempt.html#:~:text=For%20purposes%20of%20U.S.%20tax,have%20to%20pay%20these%20taxes.
86
Id.
87
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS (2015).
88
Id. at 2.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
84
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activities must be legal and follow fundamental public policy.92 If a church violates these
conditions, it may be subjected to taxes on its income.
Some contend that churches’ tax-exemption is simply a burden on the American public.
They argue that churches enjoy the benefits of the government, like police and fire protection,
without sharing the financial burden.93 Towns with financial struggles sometimes attempt to use
zoning laws to prevent the development of new churches—this fails when the federal
government enforces religious land-use laws.94 Others believe churches’ tax-exemption is
necessary to protect their religious freedom and to maintain the separation between church and
state.95 However, some religious advocates believe the conditions on tax-exemption, particularly
those against political engagement and lobbying, inhibit a church’s ability to protect and
proclaim its interests.96
In 2000, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals heard a definitive case concerning the
revocation of a church’s tax-exemption status on the grounds it had engaged in political
campaigning.97 Shortly before the 1992 presidential election, tax-exempt church Branch
Ministries placed advertisements in two newspapers, urging Christians not to vote for Bill
Clinton due to his standing on several moral issues.98 For the first time, the IRS revoked a
church’s tax-exemption status due to its engagement in politics.99 Branch Ministries claimed that
such a revocation violated their right to free exercise of religion, as protected under the First

92

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 87, at 2.
Dan Hugger, Churches, Tax Exemption, and the Common Good, STATES NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5Y37-JRP1-DYTH-G17P-0000000&context=1516831.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
98
Id. at 140.
99
Id. at 139.
93
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Amendment.100 They further argued that the loss of tax-exempt status, and the corresponding
inability for contributors to deduct their donations from their taxes, would force the church to
close.101 The Court held that a church cannot use tax-free dollars to fund political campaign
activity.102 It declared that if a church wishes to lobby, it may create a separate organization, or
form a political action committee to promote its political perspectives.103 Hence, the Court ruled
that the revocation of the church’s tax-exempt status was constitutional, but the Court also noted
that the church may reapply for tax-exemption status if it renounced all future participation in
political campaigns.104
While churches are considered tax-exempt, they are still generally required to withhold
and pay income and Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes for their employees. However,
when “wages are paid for services performed by a duly ordained, commissioned or licensed
minister of a church in the exercise of his or her ministry,” a church is not required to withhold
income tax on the compensation paid to this minister for his or her services.105 Furthermore,
churches are permitted to provide such a minister a parsonage allowance, or a housing
allowance to aid them in finding residence in the community.106
In 2016, this component of church’s tax exemption was challenged. The Freedom from
Religion Foundation, sued the IRS with the call for the termination of the parsonage allowance,
advocating for the implementation of approximately one billion dollars annually in new taxes on

100

Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142.
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 143.
104
Id.
105
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 87, at 22.
106
Id. at 23.
101
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churches across the nation.107 In 2019, the Seventh Circuit ruled against the proposal. It held that
the parsonage allowance would remain available for ministers, just as it was available for
“soldiers, diplomats, peace corps workers, prison wardens, non-profit presidents, oil
executives…” among many others.108
Religious Discrimination in Employment
Under the First Amendment, churches and other religious organizations are permitted to
discriminate in hiring and firing their employees on the basis of religion.109 Under the law, these
religious organizations are for-profit institutions operating with a primarily religious purpose on
a daily basis.110 This clause protects their autonomy; if a church could not practice religious
discrimination, it could be forced to accept pastors who do not share the church’s religion.111 As
for religious organizations, “protecting the autonomy of [faith-based organizations] was done to
enable them to succeed at what they do so well, namely help the poor and needy, and to get
[them] to participate in government programs, something [they] are far less likely to do if they
face compromising regulation.”112 However, while they may discriminate in employment on the
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basis of religion, religious organizations and churches still cannot discriminate on other factors
like race or sex.113 Moreover, some state and local laws prohibit organizations that receive
governmental funds from discriminating on the basis of religion.114
In 2009, the Sixth Circuit Court heard a case concerning a religious organization’s ability
to discriminate based on religion.115 Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc. (KBHC) is a
religious organization that received state funds as part of a program to provide care for abused
children.116 Alicia Pedreira worked at a KBHC facility, but she was fired when the organization
discovered she was homosexual.117 Karen Vance, a social worker in the area, claimed she would
have applied for a job at KBHC, but as she was also homosexual, it seemed futile.118 The two
sued KBHC, claiming the organization violated the Kentucky Civil Rights Act by discriminating
on the basis of religion.119 The Court dismissed Vance’s claim as purely speculative, holding that
she had no standing to file against KBHC because she never actually applied for a job at the
facility.120 However, the Court considered Pedreira’s claim that she was fired because she did not
share KBHC’s religious belief that homosexuality is a sin.121 The parties agreed Pedreira was
fired due to her homosexuality, yet in Kentucky, the Civil Rights Act had no provision
preventing termination on the basis of sexual orientation.122 Thus, Pedreira needed to prove that
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her termination was religious discrimination; according to the Court, she failed to prove this
claim because there was no religious aspect of her conduct that resulted in her termination.123
In another case, two teachers, Agness Morrissey-Berru and Kristen Biel, sued two
different Catholic schools where they were terminated for similar reasons.124 Both signed
agreements upon employment that explained their performances would be evaluated on religious
bases.125 Morrissey-Berru contended that her school violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 by demoting her and failing to renew her contract in order to hire a
younger teacher.126 Kristen Biel claimed she was fired because she requested a leave of absence
for chemotherapy treatment, and thus sued her school under the Americans With Disabilities
Act.127 The two schools maintained the decisions were based on the teachers’ poor classroom
performance.128 Moreover, they claimed that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause
protects their right to terminate their employees under the ministerial exception established in
case precedent.129 In December of 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated
Biel’s and Morrissey-Berru’s cases.130
The Court recognized the importance of balancing churches’ rights with individuals’
rights under law. It acknowledged that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses “protect the
right of churches and other religious institutions to decide matters ‘of faith and doctrine’ without
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government intrusion.”131 These clauses do not imply that religious organizations possess
immunity from secular law, yet they protect the essential internal decisions of a religious
institution.132 This created the ministerial exception, which bars courts from entering
employment disputes about those holding certain positions—originally described as ministers—
within religious institutions.133 To determine whether Morrissey-Berru and Biel qualified for the
ministerial exception, as the schools claimed, the Court examined their roles at the schools.134
Both taught the Catholic faith and were expected to guide students in their faith, praying with
them and preparing them for religious activities like Mass.135 Based on these factors, the Court
held that the teachers qualified for the ministerial exception even though they did not possess a
title like minister.136 Therefore, the Court determined that the government could not interfere
with the schools’ decisions to fire these employees, and the Court thus remanded the case.137
The Equality Act
In 2019, the House of Representatives proposed the Equality Act, which would add
gender identity and sexual orientation to the Civil Rights Act as a protected class.138 Thus,
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would be banned for any organization receiving
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federal funds.139 The bill passed in the House in 2021, but it has not yet passed the Senate.
Despite a Democratic majority in both houses, the act would require ten Republican votes to
override a Senate filibuster.140
Presently, twenty-nine states do not have anti-discrimination protections for sexual
orientation; in other words, in these states, LGBTQ individuals could be denied service based on
their sexual orientation.141 If the Equality Act is passed, discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation would be prohibited, and any organization discriminating on this basis would be
denied federal funding.142
Supporters of the bill argue it is necessary to ensure equal treatment for all. They
compare discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation with racial discrimination, declaring
they are both violations of human rights.143 Opponents contend the Act infringes on vital
religious freedoms.144 They fear that churches and other Christian organizations would be
required to accommodate activities that violate their religious beliefs.145 For example, churches
that believe in strictly heterosexual marriage may be forced to offer their buildings for
homosexual marriages.146 Students may no longer be permitted to use federal student loans at

Sarah Kramer, Think the “Equality Act” Will Spare Churches and Religious Schools? Think Again., ALLIANCE
DEFENDING FREEDOM (Feb. 10, 2021), https://adflegal.org/blog/think-equality-act-will-spare-churches-andreligious-schools-think-again.
140
Yonat Shimron, What’s in Store for the Equality Act, and Why do Some Religions Want a Revision? RELIGION
NEWS SERVICE (Feb. 26, 2021), https://religionnews.com/2021/02/26/whats-in-store-for-the-equality-act-and-whydo-some-religions-want-a-revision/.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Michelle Boorstein & Samantha Schmidt, Equality Act is Creating a Historic Face-Off Between Religious
Exemptions and LGBTQ Rights, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 16, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/03/16/equality-act-fairness-for-all-religious-liberty-lgbtq-lgbtbiden/.
144
Shimron, supra note 140.
145
Id.
146
Id.
139

CHURCH AND STATE FISCAL RELATIONS

24

Christian colleges that do not accept homosexuality.147 Hence, many argue that the Act punishes
Christian organizations and churches’ religious beliefs.148
As an alternative to the Equality Act, some support the Fairness for All bill, which also
protects LGBTQ individuals, but includes exclusionary provisions to protect religious
freedoms.149 However, it is highly unlikely that this bill will pass, due to the Democratic majority
in Congress.150 Yet, for the Equality Act to pass the Senate, it will most likely require
modification; thus, a compromise may form as a hybrid of these two bills.151
Christian Schools and Universities
For decades, the federal and state governments have been reluctant to grant funds to
religious schools. This general policy aims to maintain the separation of church and state and to
uphold the Establishment Clause.152 However, the government has allowed public funds to go to
religious schools for non-religious use.153 In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued several
rulings that allow an increase of public funds for religious schools, as a part of eliminating
discrimination between religious and non-religious schools.
Historically, in determining whether it is constitutional to grant public funds to a religious
school, the courts have analyzed the purpose—or intended use—of the money. The case of
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Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education established the “child benefit theory,” which
declares funds that directly benefit the students, instead of the religious school itself, to be
constitutional.154 In this case, a Louisiana statute utilized public funds to pay for every student’s
textbooks. The appellants argued that this statute unconstitutionally aided private and religious
schools by paying for those students’ textbooks with taxpayer money. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that the government had little control over private schools, and that using public
funds for aiding private organizations like religious schools would not be permissible.155
However, it clarified that the funds were not benefiting the private schools, but instead were used
for the public purpose of educating children—without discriminating on which school the child
attended.156 This distinction has been upheld in several Supreme Court cases, including ones
concerning the state provision of transport and state-financed testing for religious schools.157
Yet, in several cases, the Supreme Court has ruled against the granting of funds to
religious schools. In one case, a Pennsylvania statute reimbursed private schools, including
religious ones, for the cost of teachers’ salaries and educational material for particular secular
subjects.158 The Supreme Court held this statute was unconstitutional, because to ensure the
funds were proceeding to exclusively secular education, the state had to examine each school’s
records and monitor the flow of funds.159 This, the Court ruled, was excessive entanglement
between the church and state, violating the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.160
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Moreover, in another case, a New York law provided aid to religious schools in several
forms. For example, it established grants that funded maintenance and repairs for private schools,
it formed a tuition reimbursement plan for low-income families with children enrolled in private
schools, and it created a tax deduction for the low-income families who did not receive a tuition
reimbursement.161 The Court held that all three components were a direct violation of the
Establishment Clause, as they inevitably advanced the religious mission of these schools.162
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue
However, in 2020, the Supreme Court ruled on a prominent case to allow funds to aid
students in attending religious schools. In 2015, Montana created a program that gave tax credits
to anyone who donated to organizations that awarded scholarships for tuition at a private
school.163 However, the Montana Constitution includes a clause, known as a “Blaine
Amendment,” prohibiting government aid for a school controlled by a church or
denomination.164 Hence, Montana’s Department of Revenue determined that families could not
use these scholarships at religious schools.165 Three families sued, claiming they were
discriminated against because they could not send their children to religious schools with the
funds, while others could still send their children to secular private schools.166 The Montana
Supreme Court held that a “middle ground” could not be reached, so they canceled the program
entirely.167 The families appealed to the Supreme Court, citing the Trinity Lutheran Church
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ruling in support of their position.168 Conversely, the state argued that its Blaine Amendment
served the legitimate aim of preventing public funds from being used for religious purposes.169
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the program violated the Free Exercise
Clause by discriminating against religious schools.170 In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts
explained that “We have repeatedly held that the Establishment Clause is not offended when
religious observers and organizations benefit from neutral government programs.”171 Because
Montana’s no-aid provision bars aid to religious schools purely because of their religious nature,
it is unconstitutional.172 Roberts further clarified that the case is not focused on the use of the
funds, as the state contends, but the status of the organization receiving the funds. Because the
scholarships could not be used at a religious school purely because that school was religious—
and not whether that school would be using the funds for a religious purpose—the prohibition
falls under the Trinity Lutheran Church ruling; thus, it is unconstitutional.173 While Chief Justice
Roberts established this distinction, the Court did not rule on whether a law prohibiting the usage
of funds for religious purposes would also violate the Free Exercise Clause.174
While some applaud this decision for enabling parents to select a school that better suits
their children’s needs, others argue that the ruling harms the public school system. They claim
that diverting public funds to private, religious schools slights the quality of the state’s public
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education.175 Some are concerned of the impact this decision might have on other states—many
states possess Blaine Amendments in their constitutions that may be challenged in the future.176
Locke v. Davey
In 2004, the Supreme Court held that a Washington program assisting students with
postsecondary education costs was constitutional, even though it excluded students pursuing a
degree in theology from receiving aid.177 A student eligible for this program, Davey, elected to
attend a church-affiliated college and pursue a double-major in pastoral ministries and business
management. However, while the scholarship program permitted use of the funds at a religious
school, it prohibited the funds to be used in pursuit of a theology degree to comply with the
Washington Constitution’s bar on aiding the advancement of religion.178 When he was informed
that he could not use the scholarship for this degree, he sued with the claim that the prohibition
violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.179
The Court noted that the Washington program did “not require students to choose
between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”180 Instead, the program
permitted attendance at a religious college—it even allowed students to take religious courses.
Moreover, the Court found that the state had a legitimate interest in not funding the pursuit of
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theology, to uphold a form of the Free Exercise Clause within its constitution.181 Therefore, it
held the program’s exclusion was constitutional in a 7-2 decision.
A New Test: The Historical Approach
Based on the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, relevant case law, and recent
legislative and administrative acts, the separation of church and state is clearly essential to the
nation. Yet, cases like Trinity Lutheran Church demonstrate the importance of protecting
religion by not discriminating against churches. While the Lemon test has been used for
countless cases regarding the church and state, it is widely criticized for its subjective nature.182
Therefore, many contend a new test is necessary.183
Professor Michael McConnell proposed a historical approach to Establishment Clause
cases, which emphasizes establishment of religion as the Founders understood it.184 He
recognized six indicators of establishment in colonial times: “government control over the
doctrine and personnel of the established church, mandatory attendance in the established
church, government financial support of the established church, restrictions on worship in
dissenting churches, restrictions on political participation by dissenters, and use of the
established church to carry out civil functions.”185 Under this test, an action would be considered
unconstitutional if involved one of the six characteristics.186 However, the third prong of this
test—concerning governmental financial support—does not bar any fiscal relationship between
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the church and state. Instead, it prohibits the exclusive funding of any church or religious
entity.187 Nondiscriminatory funding, as was emphasized in Trinity Lutheran Church, would
presumably remain constitutional.188 This approach is more objective than the Lemon test, and it
provides a clearer method for identifying unconstitutional practices.189
While no perfect resolution to the complex relationship between the church and state
exists, this historical approach maintains the crucial separation between the church and state,
without treating churches and religious organizations unfairly.190 Therefore, perhaps the Supreme
Court should replace the Lemon test with McConnell’s historical approach.
Conclusion
In sum, the fiscal relationship between the church and state has continued to evolve
throughout the centuries. From arguments on the tax exemption and employment discrimination
that religious institutions enjoy to the dispute over the relief funds they receive, contentions are
unlikely to cease. Ultimately, the government must balance the freedom and rights of religious
organizations with the aim of remaining unaffiliated with any religion.
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